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Abstract This paper considers an orectic penetration hypothesis (OPH) which
says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-
externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves
further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial and non-gen-
uine instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic penetration is an interesting
possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The OPH is
thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively
impenetrable. It is of importance to issues in the philosophy of mind and cognitive
science, epistemology, and general philosophy of science. The plausibility of orectic
penetration can be motivated by some classic experimental studies, and some new
experimental research inspired by those same studies. The general suggestion is that
orectic penetration thus defined, and evidenced by the relevant studies, cannot be
deflected by the standard strategies of the cognitive impenetrability theorist.
Keywords Cognitive penetrability  Theory-ladenness  Perception  Experience 
Cognition  Modularity
If folk psychological language is any guide, we sometimes perceive what we want
to perceive. Parents tell their children things like ‘You only hear me when you want
to hear me.’ Someone may tell her spouse, ‘It was right there in front of you, you
just didn’t want to see it!’ Such charges are common in everyday contexts and,
presumably, are often just metaphorical. One should resist, however, the temptation
to hastily conclude that these are just empty contemporary idioms. Linguistic trends
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such as these often have a way of tracking some real fact about the world. The fact
that these idioms all suggest is that we sometimes perceive what we want to
perceive. A question for the philosophy of mind and cognitive science is whether
this is a fact: do our desires influence our perceptual experiences in some interesting
way?
Current science of the mind may not afford a conclusive answer to this question,
but it does provide important data. Some of this data, it will be argued below, counts
against the negative answer favoured by many philosophers (implicitly or
explicitly), namely, that higher level states like beliefs and desires do not affect
experience. An opposing thesis, the orectic penetration hypothesis (OPH), says that
desire-like mental states sometimes causally influence perceptual experience by
strictly internal mechanisms. This hypothesis is sharpened and clarified with a
definition in Sect. 1. This analysis usefully distinguishes interesting instances of the
phenomenon from trivial ones, and (as discussed in Sect. 3) precludes the
application of the standard strategies taken by the sceptics of higher-level influence
on perception.
Second, with this definition and hypothesis in hand, one can consider the
philosophical and scientific importance of the possibility of orectic penetration. This
possibility is of interest, most simply, since it contributes to a general account of
mental architecture. Indeed, if desire or desire-like states do influence perception in
some non-trivial way, then we have an interesting case of cognitive penetration—
where a cognitive state causally influences perceptual experience. Cognitive
penetrability is of interest to epistemologists, philosophers of mind, and cognitive
scientists for a variety of reasons. A few of these issues are discussed in Sect. 2
below.
Finally, some experimental cases can be adduced to motivate the plausibility of
the orectic penetration hypothesis. These cases must be defended against the more
orthodox claim that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. The latter
theorists employ some standard strategies for deflecting any putative case of higher
order influence on perception. Ironically, it turns out that one of the first
experimental studies on the possibility of desire-influenced perception may best
evade these strategies. This study and its general interpretive spirit, it will be
suggested, deserves renewed consideration.
1 The orectic penetration hypothesis
In an obvious sense, perceptual experiences influence our desires and evaluations.
Indeed, one sometimes needs to experience something before one can want it or
evaluate it as good, bad, beautiful, etc. Until one tastes chocolate or coffee or Scotch
whisky one does not crave such things. Can the causal arrow run the other direction?
Might a desire or some other orectic mental state influence perceptual experience?
Recent philosophy of mind and cognitive science has tended to answer this question
in the negative. Desires do not influence experience, since more generally, higher-
level mental states do not directly or internally influence perceptual processing so as
to affect experience.
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The alternative thesis is worth considering. Suppose I might hear something in a
certain way, see something in a certain way, taste something a certain way, because
of a desire of mine. Suppose, that is, that the character or content of an experience
may be different as a result of some desire or wish or preference held by the
perceiver. A familiar and intuitive example may help.
Consider cases of disagreement about what is seen in a sporting match. During a
recent football season, the pubs in England were filled, as they often are, with fans
for two rival clubs: Arsenal and Manchester United. At one point in the game,
Arsenal’s keeper was caught off the goal leaving Manchester United’s striker in a
good position to score. However, one of Arsenal’s defence managed to place
himself between the shot and the goal, effectively blocking the shot. Now, on first
sight, it wasn’t clear whether the Arsenal player used his head or his elbow to block
the shot. If he used his head, then it is a good bit of defence. If he used his elbow, it
is a hand ball and a free kick for Manchester United. Important stakes, and so
obviously Arsenal fans would prefer the former, Manchester United fans, the latter.
The trouble was that even upon replay, it wasn’t clear which was the case. Unless,
of course, you were a devoted fan: while the instant replays were shown, Arsenal
fans reported that they ‘‘could see’’ the ball contact the defenseman’s head.
Manchester United fans reported the opposite: they ‘‘could see’’ the ball contact his
elbow. Some of these reports are no doubt accompanied by a guilty conscience, but
assume some of them are honest.1
These experiences are good candidates for desire-influenced perception: these
fans were seeing what they wanted to see. Call any such case of perceptual
experience orectically penetrated, which may be defined as follows.
(OP) A perceptual experience E is orectically penetrated if and only if (1) E is
causally dependent upon some orectic state D and (2) the causal link between E
and D is internal.
An orectic penetration hypothesis (OPH) says that perceptual experiences of the
kind defined in OP may occur. Desire-like mental states sometimes causally
influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way.
Some clarifications are in order. First, to be clear, OPH is distinct from the well-
established thesis that desires and desire-like states can affect rational decision-
making, belief-formation, and other cognitive processing. It is also distinct from
theses concerning self-deception (at least insofar as the deception involves a self-
motivated adjustment to one’s beliefs or other doxastic states). OPH is a
substantially more controversial thesis; it concerns desire-influenced perceptual
experience.
The concepts ‘perceptual experience’ and ‘orectic state’ deserve brief clarifica-
tion. Perceptual experiences are, minimally, states with phenomenal character and
1 One can think of examples from whatever sport one prefers. Think of a controversial strike called in
baseball. Think of a questionable case of the basketball leaving a player’s hand before the buzzer. Think
of controversial cases where the ball is close to the line in tennis (perhaps many of John McEnroe’s
tantrums were based on a perceptual experience relevantly distinct from the line judge’s). All of these are
candidate cases, circumstances where (even upon replay) the image is to some degree ambiguous and
relevant desires may influence perceptual experience.
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ones that result (non-trivially) from one or more sensory organ. In Nagel’s famous
terms, there is something it is like, for the subject, to have a visual experience, an
auditory experience, an olfactory experience, and so on (Nagel 1974). This
assumption is neutral with respect to the relation between the content of perceptual
experience and its phenomenology.
‘Orectic state’ is understood to denote desires and desire-like mental states. So in
addition to desires, orectic states include likes, preferences, hopes, wishes, values,
and longings, among others. For a start, orectic states are typified by a drive or
motivation towards some object or outcome, where this drive disposes the agent to
act, other things being equal, so as to satisfy the attitude or state in question (to
acquire the object or the outcome of the orectic state). A desire for a beer is an
attitude that disposes one to get a beer. My liking of rock and roll disposes me to
purchase albums and attend concerts. Your hope to get the job disposes you to take
extra time preparing the application. These are all orectic states.2
One additional clarification on the notion of desire. It is assumed here that some
desires are cognitive states. This assumption is motivated by the following features of
desire. Some desires are representational (for example, the desire for money); some
desires have propositional content (for example, the desire that Jones win the election);
and some desires play an ineliminable role in decision making and reasoning (for
example, the desire to invest wisely). The same can be said for other orectic states such
as goals, wishes, hopes, and values. Mental states that meet these characteristics are, at
least broadly speaking, cognitive. One might think that this assumption is incompat-
ible with a common philosophical practice of categorizing desires as ‘conative’ or
‘affective’, by contrast with other mental states like beliefs and memories. In fact, the
assumption is consistent with this categorization. Conative states are motivational
states; and affective states are typified by a phenomenal or emotional character.
Granting the plausible claim that (at least some) desires are both conative and affective
in these respects, this does not imply that all desires are non-cognitive (in the minimal
sense of ‘cognitive’ characterized above). Generally, ‘cognitive’, ‘conative’, and
‘affective’ are terms for non-exclusive mental state categories.3
Clarifying the clauses of the definition clarifies the corresponding OPH. This will
also serve to distinguish the target phenomenon and obviate possible confusions.
Clause (1) of OP should be understood as follows. D is a non-sufficient cause of E.
There are other relevant causal factors. As a first pass, one may interpret the causal
dependency counterfactually. The suggestion is only that an orectic state is causally
relevant such that, counterfactually, if state D had not been present in the
perceptual-cognitive system of the agent, then that agent would not have had
2 Two brief notes. First, understanding orectic states in this way makes minimal commitments to a theory
of desire or of, more broadly, orexis. A number of distinct and incompatible conceptions of desire are
consistent with OP, e.g. Armstrong (1980), Smith (1994), Schroeder (2004) and Stalnaker (1984).
Second, ‘desire’ will sometimes be used below as shorthand for any orectic state.
3 It is worth noting that this way of thinking about desire comports with the thinking of potential
opponents of OPH—namely, cognitive impenetrability theorists, as discussed below—who include goals,
values, and ‘‘other utilities’’ (i.e. other than belief) as possible penetrating cognitive states (i.e. those states
that the same thinkers deny can influence perception, and thereby deny the cognitive penetration of, at
least some of, perception). See Pylyshyn (1999, p. 343) and Fodor (1983, 1985).
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perceptual experience E. Note also that this way of defining orectic penetration
allows for a desire to influence a belief or some other mental state, which then
influences E. This scenario is perhaps not quite as striking but the (internal) causal
dependency still obtains.
Clause (2) of OP should be understood as follows. Assume for simplicity that a
mental process is just a series of (internal) mental events. Mental processes that
stand in a direct causal relation with a perceptual experience can be thought of as
unscreened or immediate causal ancestors. Clause (2) says that if one of these
unscreened internal causes involves a desire—that is, the causal chain runs from
experience back to a desire without deviating from the internal process—then the
perception depends (internally) upon a desire. Counterfactually, had D not been
present in the process, E would not be had by the subject. D is thus a necessary
causal condition for E. Understood probabilistically, the desire is not a strictly
necessary causal element, but one that is highly relevant to the probability of that
perceptual experience. E is more likely to be had when D is present, and less when
not present. The preferred notion of causation is of little matter so long as the
internal causal dependency is maintained.
Finally, clause (2) of (OP) excludes trivial cases. For example, I may desire to see
my dog rather than my computer screen. I satisfy my desire by shifting my visual
gaze from what is directly in front of me to what is several degrees to my immediate
right. You may desire to smell the sea and as a result spontaneously make your way
to the nearest coast. In cases like these, a desire to have a perceptual experience
motivates an action (or set of actions) which eventually results in the desired
experience. The perceptual experience depends counterfactually upon the relevant
desire. But this is not a relevantly interesting class of phenomena. Clause (2) insures
that these are not instances of orectic penetration, since in each case the desire is
screened from being internally, causally efficacious: the desire causes an (external)
action which eventually results in the experience.4
Clause (2) also excludes deviant cases. Imagine cases where one desires to have a
particular perceptual experience, and so takes a drug to elicit that experience, or
hires a back alley neurosurgeon, or submits to some kind of Experience Machine.
One would thus have the desired experience, and as a result of one’s desire. But
while D may be a causal ancestor of E, the causal link is not purely internal and the
desire is screened off. These are not cases of orectic penetration as defined.
2 Philosophical and scientific relevance
Before providing plausible experimental cases of orectic penetration, the philo-
sophical and scientific relevance of the phenomenon should be clarified. What sorts
4 For that matter, some of these cases may be effectively ruled out by clause (1), for example if the causal
dependence is understood counterfactually. An olfactory experience of the sea may not depend
counterfactually on a desire to smell the sea. You might drag me to the sea, and I would then experience
the sea whether or not I had the corresponding desire. Clause (2) thus insures the exclusion of desire-
motivated cases involving sophisticated ceteris paribus clauses—clauses to the effect that the context is
such that the general causal dependence holds and (1) is satisfied.
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of implications would the truth of OPH have? Most simply, it would contribute to an
overall architecture of the mind, and in turn provide an explanandum for the
behavioural and brain sciences. If desires influence perceptual experience in the
described ways, we will want to know why—e.g. evolutionarily—and how—e.g.
neurophysiologically.
More specifically, if one grants that (some) desires are cognitive, then OPH is
inconsistent with a cognitive impenetrability thesis. A cognitive impenetrability
thesis says that for any two perceivers (or for the same perceiver at different times),
if one holds fixed the object or event of perception, the perceptual conditions, the
spatial attention of the subject, and the conditions of the sensory organ(s), then the
perceptual experiences of those perceivers will be identical (see Macpherson,
forthcoming). If the experiences of the two perceivers are distinct in these
circumstances, and as a result of distinct cognitive states of the perceivers, then
experience is, instead, cognitively penetrable. As one cognitive impenetrability
theorist defines it, ‘‘[I]f a system is cognitively penetrable then the function it
computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organism’s goals and
beliefs…’’ (Pylyshyn 1999, p. 343).5
OPH suggests that you and I may have distinct experiences—holding all the
relevant perceptual conditions fixed—as a result of our distinct desires. An
orectically penetrated experience involves a higher-order cognitive state (a desire,
wish, like, etc.) influencing the content or character of a perceptual experience.
Commitment to OPH therefore implies commitment to the cognitive penetrability of
experience.6 Two motivations for maintaining the opposing cognitive impenetra-
bility thesis—modularity and the theory-neutrality of observation—are considered
below. OPH bears consequences for these issues as well.
Some theorists maintain that cognitive and sensory systems are modular in their
operation. Visual, auditory, and haptic sensory systems, for example, perform
discrete sets of computational tasks and are, in Jerry Fodor’s terms, informationally
encapsulated (Fodor 1983). A commitment to informational encapsulation of
perceptual modules implies the cognitive impenetrability of those modules. So any
modularity theorist who makes this commitment has independent motivation to
resist cognitive penetration and, more specifically, orectic penetration. If perception
can be penetrated by desires or other cognitive states, (some) modularity theorists
will have to provide an alternative explanation of penetration without abandoning
strong modularity of sensory systems.7
Orectic penetration and cognitive penetrability are also relevant to a traditional
debate in philosophy of science concerning the relation between observation and
5 According to Fodor, processes are cognitively penetrated if they are ‘‘importantly affected by the
subject’s beliefs, his background information, or his utilities’’ (Fodor 1983, p. 73). Given what Fodor says
elsewhere, desires seem to be included amongst the relevant cognitive states (e.g. see Fodor 1983, p. 68).
6 Indeed, OP readily generalizes to a definition of cognitive penetrability by simple replacement of the
desire placeholder ‘D’ with a general placeholder for cognitive states.
7 See Fodor (1983, 1985, 1988), Pylyshyn (1984) and Sperber (1996). See Stokes and Bergeron (MS) for
a dilemma for modularity architectures, one horn of which challenges a commitment to informational
encapsulation by appeal to the incompatibility with plausible cases of cognitive penetrability of
perception.
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theory. Some theorists have maintained that observation is theory-neutral, others
that observation is theory-laden. According to the first view, empirical observations
are made in a way that is uninfluenced by theoretical background. If observations
are made in a way that meets standards of scientific method, whatever those
standards should be, then those observations provide objective data for theory
construction, and may adjudicate, all else being equal, between competing theories.
Others have argued that observation is theory-laden (Feyerabend 1962; Hanson
1958, 1969; Kuhn 1962). Theory-ladenness presents a challenge to both rational
theory choice and the prospects for scientific knowledge. If observation is
influenced by theoretical background, then observation does not provide objective
data to support, test, or choose theories, but instead already imbeds theoretical
interpretations.8
If perceptual experience is penetrated by theories or belief, and observation is
based on perception (or just is perception), then observation is theory-laden.9
Friends of theory-ladenness thus stand to benefit from the truth of any thesis that
maintains that beliefs or theories are among cognitively penetrating states. A
cognitive impenetrability thesis does not entail that observation is theory-neutral (if
observation is something over and above perception), but if true, this would
eliminate one possible way in which observation is influenced by theory. So friends
of theory-neutrality should be motivated to show that experience is not penetrated in
these ways. And indeed, this is how the debate has largely played out between Paul
Churchland and Jerry Fodor. Churchland maintains that observation is theory-laden,
since perception is influenced by concepts, knowledge, learning, and theory
(Churchland 1979, 1988, 1989). Fodor argues that perception is (sufficiently)
cognitively impenetrable, and on this basis maintains that theory-neutral observa-
tion may provide a foundation for empirical knowledge (Fodor 1984, 1988).10
It should be obvious that in the context of scientific theory testing and choice,
orectic penetration would be particularly problematic. Suppose one’s desires
regarding one’s theories might influence one’s perception. In turn, one might then
appeal to one’s observations (based on or identified with those perceptual
experiences) to further motivate one’s theoretical choices. This circularity would
undermine the epistemic role of observation in this particular scientific investigation
and, if sufficiently widespread, undermine that role entirely.
This last epistemic concern regarding observation generalizes. As Susanna Siegel
has recently argued, cognitive penetration of experience would have significant
consequences for the epistemic justification of perceptual states (Siegel, forthcom-
ing). In some cases, the penetration would be an epistemic good. For example, a
well-trained scientist or medical doctor may see things better, and make better
8 For a recent survey on theory-laden observation and science, and how it engages with perception and
cognitive penetration, see Brewer and Lambert (2001).
9 An unfortunate ambiguity in this literature is that some use ‘observation’ to refer to perception, others
to something more like judgement or belief (about what one perceives).
10 See Macpherson for additional discussion of possible moves for both Churchland and Fodor
(Macpherson, forthcoming). See Siegel for discussion of possible relevant cases of cognitive
penetrability, including cases of desire-influenced perception in the context of scientific observation
(Siegel, forthcoming).
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decisions on the basis of that experience, in virtue of her knowledge and expertise.
However, if experience is to provide evidence for beliefs or, on some accounts, a
foundation for knowledge, then there may be cases where penetration would be
epistemically problematic. Siegel considers a case where Jill believes that Jack is
angry. Suppose this belief influences Jill’s visual experience of Jack such that Jack
appears angry to Jill. If Jill takes her visual experience as evidence for her belief that
Jack is angry, she has effectively moved in a circle, with her belief that Jack is angry
supporting her belief that Jack is angry. On few accounts of epistemic justification is
this acceptable.11
Orectic penetration would be epistemically problematic and perhaps without
exception. Seeing something or seeing in a way because one wants would
undermine the justificatory role that, many think, experience plays. To illustrate,
consider an exaggerated example. Suppose you and I disagree about the colour of a
friend’s car. We place a bet: you bet that the car is brown and I bet that the car is
red. Presumably, we each have a corresponding desire: you want the car to be brown
and I want the car to be red. Should either of these desires affect perceptual
experience, then that experience is eliminated (or at least weakened) as a possible
source of evidence. Generally, desire-influenced perception will fail to provide a
reason for belief.
3 The case for orectic penetration
It should be clear that the possibility of orectic penetration, and cognitive
penetration more generally, is relevant to a number of issues in philosophy and
cognitive science. Are there good reasons to think that orectic penetration actually
occurs?
A number of psychologists have researched the effect that certain drives, in
particular hunger, have on perceptual response. Seymour Epstein presented
ambiguous stimuli to subjects who had been deprived of food for varying amounts
of time (Epstein 1961). In brief, the experiments showed that food-related responses
(the identification of people or animals seeking, preparing, or eating food in the
ambiguous stimuli) varied directly with hunger, increasing through 8 h (but
decreasing after 23 h) of deprivation.12
This provides a potential example of orectic penetration. The subjects suffering
from food-deprivation (and thus, crudely, having a desire for food) were more likely
to see food-related items or activities in ambiguous figures. Put another way, they
had experiences as of food items, and these experiences apparently depend in a non-
trivial way on the hunger desires. As born out by the statistical evidence, without the
11 Siegel presents cognitive penetration as a potential general constraint on theories of epistemic
justification. In particular, she argues that dogmatist theories of justification are ill-equipped to meet the
constraints imposed by cognitive penetration (Siegel, forthcoming).
12 The conclusions presented here are experimentally sound, but there is some controversy surrounding a
number of additional conclusions drawn by Epstein and others. For related studies and/or criticism, see
Lazarus et al. (1953), Saugstad (1966, 1967) and Wolitzky (1967).
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hunger desire the subjects were much less likely to see food items. Hungry people,
the thought would go, sometimes see what they want.
Here one might worry that while hunger is motivational, it lacks representational
content and is better regarded as a primitive drive; hunger is non-cognitive. More
recent work improves upon the older food-deprivation research. One set of research
suggests that food-preferences—for instance, a preference for one beverage over
another—biases the perceptual interpretation of ambiguous figures, where subjects
disambiguate briefly displayed figures (400 ms) in a way that favours the desired
outcome, namely, the preferred beverage (Balcetis and Dunning 2006).13 A second
set of research suggests that objects that can fulfil immediate goals (a water bottle
when thirsty; a $100 bill) are seen as closer than they actually are, as contrasted with
the perceived distance of less desirable objects (Balcetis and Dunning 2010). In both
sets of studies, the influencing state is cognitive, at least insofar as it is
representational and stands in appropriate relations with other cognitive states like
belief and intention.
The cognitive impenetrability theorist might deny that the above data imply
genuine cognitive penetration by appeal to one or more of some common sceptical
strategies. The Epstein (1961) and Balcetis and Dunning (2006) data might be
resisted by appeal to an attention-shift interpretation. This interpretation maintains
that the prior cognitive state causes a change in the allocation of attention. Thus the
link between cognition and perception is mediated by some act of attention.
Pylyshyn’s account, for example, rules out attention-shift cases as non-genuine
cases of cognitive penetration since in such cases there is no internal, logical
connection between the belief, goal, or other cognitive state and the computations
performed by the perceptual system (Pylyshyn 1999, p. 343). Lacking this internal
connection, there is nothing to properly call ‘penetration’.14
The Balcetis and Dunning (2006) data might also be resisted by a memory
interpretation. In these studies, subjects are tasked to categorize an ambiguous figure
(e.g. a figure that is ambiguous between a seal or a horse) and told that they will be
rewarded for certain categorization results (e.g. in one study, some subjects would
receive a desirable food for reporting more sea creatures than farm animals, or vice
versa). The results suggest to Balcetis and Dunning that desires are influencing how
the ambiguous figures are perceived. But importantly, the categorization report is
made after the figure has been displayed on a computer screen and then removed, and
this leaves the door open for the alternative memory interpretation. Perhaps the
13 One worry regarding this particular study is that the reports of these subjects are not to be trusted
(perhaps subjects report seeing the ambiguous figure in just the way that is supposed to result in the
desirable beverage). Balcetis and Dunning respond to this worry with a follow up study that uses non-
ambiguous figures. In this set up, the subjects identify the non-ambiguous figures with 100% accuracy (no
matter whether such identification results in the desirable or undesirable beverage). See Balcetis and
Dunning (2006, p. 615).
14 Elsewhere, Pylyshyn suggests that the allocation of attention is one way that cognition can penetrate
perception: it is one of two loci where ‘‘cognition intervenes in determining the nature of perception’’
(Pylyshyn 1999, p. 344). However, the cognitive influence takes place in a way that fails to meet
Pylyshyn’s internal, logical connection requirement (of genuine cognitive penetration). So it is unclear
why such cases would be considered, by Pylyshyn or anyone else, cognitive penetration. See also Fodor
(1988).
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subjects merely recall, and subsequently report, the stimulus to be a certain way, and
as a result of some background desire (or expectation). This provides evidence for the
uncontroversial phenomenon of cognition penetrating cognition, rather than for
cognition penetrating experience.
Finally, a critic might resist these studies by another common strategy. Rather
than evidencing some desire-influenced or otherwise cognitively affected perceptual
experience, some of these data only suggest an influence on judgements or beliefs
about the perceptual stimulus. According to this judgement interpretation,
judgements are cognitively influenced in experimental subjects while experience
remains unaffected across the subjects. For instance, one might resist the Balcetis
and Dunning (2010) data by this method. In some of these studies, experimental
subjects make distance estimates regarding a desired object. Subjects tend to
underestimate the distance to a desired object, and so the experimenters suggest that
desires are affecting visual experience. However, the data is open to the
interpretation that subjects are simply misjudging the relevant distances as a result
of the background desires.15
Grant that these interpretive strategies, if applicable, are effective; any putative
case of cognitive penetration that can be interpreted along one of these three lines is
not a genuine instance of cognitive penetration. Here a value of the definition
articulated above, OP, becomes clear. Clause (1) of OP rules out both the memory
and judgement interpretations, since it requires that a perceptual experience is
cognitively influenced. Clause (2) rules out the attention-shift interpretation since it
requires an internal link between the influencing desire and experience. The
question then becomes whether any experimental cases satisfy OP.
Set to one side whether some of the above studies can be finessed to evidence
perceptual experiences that meet OP and evade the three sceptical strategies.
Instead, consider some research from the New Look psychology movement of the
mid-twentieth century. As it turns out, one of the earliest New Look studies best
evades the sceptical strategies.16
In a now well-known experiment, Jerome Bruner and C.C. Goodman found a
number of interesting results regarding perceptual experiences of objects of social
value (Bruner and Goodman 1947). In brief, the experiment ran as follows. Three
groups (10 persons per group) of 10 year old children, two experimental and one
control, were put before a wooden box with a glass screen on its face. In the centre
of the screen was a small patch of light, nearly circular in shape, the diameter of
which could be adjusted by a small knob located on the bottom right corner of the
box. The two experimental groups of children were presented with ordinary coins of
varying values. As they looked at the coins, placed flat in the palm of the left hand,
15 Balcetis and Dunning (2010) attempt to control for this possible scenario by introducing an action-
based report into later experiments. Here subjects toss an item as a distance estimate (rather than verbally
providing a numerical estimate). For this to evade the relevant judgement interpretation, however, one has
to make the contentious assumption that visual perception is directly linked with action and in these very
kinds of perceptual circumstances.
16 Macpherson analyzes both the judgement and attention-shift strategies, arguing that both fail to handle
data from colour perception studies performed by Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) (see Macpherson,
forthcoming).
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positioned at the same height and six inches to the left of the adjustable patch of
light, they were asked to adjust the patch to match the size of the presented coin.
The subjects could take as much time as they liked to complete the task. The control
group was instead presented with cardboard discs of sizes identical to the relevant
coins, and asked to perform the same task. Here is the first result of interest: in the
experimental group, perceptual experience of the coins was ‘‘accentuated.’’ The
experimental subjects systematically overestimated the size of the coin, and
sometimes by a difference as high as 30% as compared with control subjects. (For
instance, experimental subjects overestimated the size of a dime by an average of
29%; controls underestimated the size of the cardboard analogue of a dime by
-1%.)
The second experimental variation divided experimental groups into subgroups
comprising ‘‘rich’’ children and ‘‘poor’’ children. The task was the same, except
only real coins were used. Here the results are even more striking. Rich children, as
the previous results would predict, still overestimate the size of the coins, but at
percentages significantly lower than the poor children. Indeed, poor children
systematically overestimate the size of coins, by as much as 50%, and by differences
as high as 30% as compared to rich children.
The general New Look hypothesis was that the value or subjective importance of
the perceived object somehow works into the visual perception of the size of that
object. This hypothesis is born out by both the first and second set of results
mentioned above. Generally, children of such an age understand the social value of
money, thus having some minimal desire for money, and as a result see the coins as
bigger. And, Bruner and Goodman postulated, the poor children feel a greater need
or desire for money and so perceive the coins as (even) bigger than they actually are.
A few historical notes are worth brief mention. The New Look psychological
movement has proved to be controversial as a general theory of perception and
cognition, with decades of research following Bruner and Goodman’s (1947) study.
Much of this research successfully produced relevantly similar results (e.g. Bruner
and Postman 1948; Dukes and Bevan 1952; Bruner and Rodrigues 1953; Blum
1957; Holzkamp and Perlwitz 1966). Other research was critical: some researchers
identified stimuli of value that did not influence perceptual reports in the same way
(Lysak and Gilchrist 1955; Carter and Schooler 1949); others suggested that
additional non-evaluative variables may be at work (Klein et al. 1951); others
argued that the accentuation of perception by higher-level ‘‘affective’’ states was
context-sensitive: occurring in some contexts but not others (Carter and Schooler
1949; Tajfel and Wilkes 1963). One should distinguish criticism that denies the
weak claim that perception is sometimes directly affected by higher level mental
states, from criticism to the effect that the details or scope of the New Look
hypotheses require revision. The vast majority of criticism, including those listed
above, falls into the second category.17 The use of the New Look studies here only
requires the weaker claim, and this claim will be defended below against some
standard critical strategies.
17 See Jenkin (1957) and Tajfel (1957) for important theoretical reviews that support this general
conclusion.
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If we take the reports of Bruner and Goodman’s subjects as accurate with respect
to what they see, then we have instances of orectic penetration as defined. The
subject has a desire for money. This desire causally influences the subject’s
perceptual experience of coins, namely, it influences the size properties of the
objects as experienced. And this influence is achieved internally: the background
desires/s influence the visual processing of the coins. This interpretation has,
nonetheless, been resisted. Critics appeal to one or more of the above strategies—
the memory, attention-shift, and judgement interpretations—to reject results like
Bruner and Goodman (1947) as evidence for genuine cases of cognitive penetration.
These methods for resistance as applied to this data, however, are less plausible than
the interpretation they oppose.
The memory18 and attention-shift19 interpretations both fail for the same reason:
they fail to apply given the experimental methods of Bruner and Goodman’s studies.
The subjects in this experiment had as much time as they liked to inspect the
stimulus (coins for the experimental subjects) and adjust the patch of light while
they inspected the stimulus. Moreover, the stimulus was located at the same
horizontal level and six inches to the left of the adjustable light patch. Thus in no
sense were the subjects making reports just based on memory; the memory
interpretation fails. And in no relevant sense were the subjects inspecting the coin
and then shifting attention to a distinct visual field. Of course there may be some
gaze shifting between stimulus and adjustable light patch, but this would not have
differed between control and experimental subjects and so would fail to explain the
relevant differences between such subjects. The attention-shift interpretation fails.
Finally, a critic may appeal to the judgement interpretation. Here one responds to
the Bruner and Goodman results by suggesting that the child’s desire for money
affects her beliefs or judgements about money. And children with less money, it
turns out, make even grosser overestimates of the size of money. This judgement is
then reported by the subjects and explains the differences recorded in the
experimental results. Importantly, the only version of this interpretation that is
inconsistent with the cognitive penetration of perception is one where the perceptual
experiences of the subjects are static across control and experimental subjects alike.
That is, like controls, the experimental subjects have an accurate perceptual
experience of the coins; only their judgements are biased by their background
desires. Pylyshyn flags this as a second scenario where cognition can influence
perception. But as he describes it, here cognition influences ‘‘decisions involved in
recognizing and identifying patterns’’ (Pylyshyn 1999, p. 344; emphasis added).
This fails to meet any of the definitions of orectic penetration or, broadly, cognitive
penetration (including Pylyshyn’s own, as cited above). So this interpretation, as a
final method of resisting genuine cognitive penetrability, is worth extended
consideration.
One can begin to see the problems with application of the judgement
interpretation by recalling the experimental setup in the Bruner and Goodman
study. Again, subjects took as much time as they needed to adjust the light patch to
18 McCurdy (1956).
19 Fodor (1988) and Pylyshyn (1999).
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match the size of the coins that they currently inspected (the coins located six inches
to the left of the patch). So the subjects were not making flash judgements. Instead,
they were able to make well-considered adjustments, comparing the two visual
stimuli at the same time in the same visual field. The judgement interpretation
maintains that the (experimental) subject perceives the coin accurately. Simulta-
neously, the subject makes and eventually reports a judgement that mischaracterizes
the size of the coin. Therefore, implausibly, this interpretation requires attributing a
judgement or belief to the subject which does not correspond to the perceptual
experience that she is having simultaneously with that judgement or belief.
In response, the cognitive impenetrability theorist may invoke clear examples
where judgements or beliefs clearly come apart from simultaneous experience. To
take one of the favoured examples, in spite of one’s beliefs that the two lines in the
Mu¨ller-Lyer illusion are of the same length, one will continue to see the lines as
differing in length. One cannot, as it were, get one’s beliefs to penetrate
experience.20 This is true for the Mu¨ller-Lyer and other similar illusions; but these
illusions are not sufficiently analogous to the Bruner and Goodman experiments.
The relevant difference is this: When a person reports (correctly) that the two
Mu¨ller-Lyer lines are of the same length, she is not (and recognizes that she is not)
basing the reported judgement on her perceptual experience (of the illusion as it is
normally presented). She is instead relying on knowledge or testimony to judge and
report that the lines are of the same length. By contrast, in performing the task
given, Bruner and Goodman’s subjects are inspecting the coin and ostensibly basing
their report on what they see. They would certainly report that they are matching the
light patch to what they are seeing. So, unlike persons perceiving the Mu¨ller-Lyer
lines, these subjects intend for their action to report what they are seeing. To treat
these subjects as analogous to perceivers of standard visual illusions would imply
that the subjects are systematically mistaken about what they are doing: they are not
reporting what they are seeing.
So the judgement interpretation does not readily apply to the Bruner and
Goodman results. It requires that the subjects are not correctly reporting what they
see, since their perceptual experience is accurate and the reported judgement
inaccurate. Instead, this interpretation must maintain that these subjects are
continually ignoring, remaining unconscious of, or somehow otherwise failing to
accurately report a current perceptual experience. This is less plausible than the
interpretation it opposes, namely, that experience is penetrated by desire.
One might finally respond by appealing to the fact that the subjects in Bruner and
Goodman’s study are children; perhaps this explains the relevant results. Note first
that this explanation cannot be one premised on an immature failure to understand
the experimental task: Bruner and Goodman take relevant precautions to insure that
the young subjects understand what they are supposed to do, and how to manipulate
the experimental apparatus (Bruner and Goodman 1947, p. 37). Nor will it suffice to
appeal to the fact that poor children are less familiar with money (McCurdy 1956).
This response fails to explain the first set of data, where children of varying
economic backgrounds overestimate the size of coins relative to the controls who
20 Fodor (1983, 1985) and Pylyshyn (1999) both invoke this example.
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are presented with cardboard discs. And it commits to an implausible general
hypothesis about perception. Children encounter unfamiliar stimuli all the time.
There is no reason to think that, as a general fact about perception, a child’s
estimation of an object’s size co-varies inversely with the familiarity of that object.
Instead, to deflect the Bruner and Goodman results on the basis of the age of the
experimental subjects, one would seem to have to make either of the following
claims. Coins (and not cardboard discs) somehow affect the perceptual and
cognitive capacities of children (and not adults) in such a way that either
(a) children make inaccurate judgements about accurate perceptual experiences or
(b) perceptual experiences of children are penetrated by background cognitive states
regarding money. (a) refines the judgement interpretation as a description of only
certain child perceivers in the relevant circumstances; (b) accepts cognitive
penetrability, but just for kids.
Ultimately, the evidence is insufficient to conclusively rule out the first of these
alternatives, (a). But here again, the evidence favours an inference to an
interpretation that accepts cognitive penetration. In this context, the choice is
between a consistent failure among children to make accurate judgements about
certain classes of simultaneously perceived stimuli and not others versus a direct
cognitive influence on perceptual experience. This is an easy choice. There is little
reason to think that, relative to adult perceivers, the minds of children work as
deviantly as the first choice requires. Rather, the best explanation is that the children
are seeing the coins differently and making reports accordingly.
The Bruner and Goodman study itself leaves open the possibility that cognitive
penetration is an effect found only in perceivers of younger ages (as per (b) above).
An outstanding empirical question would then be whether these kinds of effects
disappear as children mature. In fact, recent studies suggest otherwise. In one study,
very much inspired by the New Look paradigm, adult perceivers estimate
identically sized discs in a way that substantially varies depending upon whether
the discs contain negative images versus neutral or positive images. The researchers
conclude that the subjects have and apply background values to the varying images,
and this influences size perception of the discs (van Ulzen et al. 2008). This
provides good evidence that the general hypothesized phenomenon is not exclusive
to children.
To conclude, the best explanation of the Bruner and Goodman (1947) data, given
the experimental circumstances, is that perceptual experience is accurately reported
by the subject’s actions, namely, by her adjustment of the light patch. The subject
sees the coin as bigger (than it actually is) and so reports that the coin is bigger. This
experience causally depends, in a non-externally mediated way, upon the desires of
the subject. And whether there is a judgement or belief that mediates the perceptual
experience and the report is of no matter to the hypothesis. Either way, it is an
instance of orectic penetration as defined. This is an important defence for any
friend of a cognitive penetrability thesis, since it blocks the common strategies for
deflecting putative cases of cognitive penetration. With respect to Bruner and
Goodman’s (1947) results—as well as a number of the other New Look-inspired
data cited above—the memory, attention-shift, and judgement interpretations are all
less plausible than the cognitive penetration interpretation. Unless there is some
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fourth line of interpretation, these cases remain plausible cases of cognitive
penetration generally and of orectic penetration specifically. The cognitive
impenetrability theorist must find another strategy to dismiss them.
4 Conclusion
Desire-influenced perception would have significant practical and theoretical
consequences. The possibility has typically been resisted, and by the same
strategies used to resist the more general phenomenon of cognitive penetrability.
Optimistically, the above discussion shows why these sceptical strategies fail to rule
out the phenomenon as defined by OP and, more importantly, fail to deflect some of
the adduced cases that meet OP. Granting this conclusion, the sceptic must devise a
new strategy for resisting these and other putative cases of cognitive penetrability.
More conservatively, the above discussion at least shows that there are more precise
ways to conceptualize one type of cognitive penetrability: orectic penetration
understood in terms of OP. And instances of this phenomenon are not so easily
dismissed by the standard sceptical strategies. Ironically, it is a renewed look at the
original New look studies that may provide the most compelling evidence, and
hopefully revitalize philosophical discussion of and scientific experimentation on an
interesting potential feature of the human mind.
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